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THE QUALITATIVE FOURTH AMENDMENT:
THE CASE FOR A REFINED, INFORMATION-FOCUSED
APPROACH TO FOURTH AMENDMENT CASES INVOLVING
NONTRESPASSORY GOVERNMENT SURVEILLANCE
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INTRODUCTION
In his 2001 majority opinion for Kyllo v. United States, Justice
Scalia adopted his characteristic chiding tone to gently reproach
what he saw as a notably liberal departure from the original textual
interpretation of the Constitution.1 The Katz test for Fourth
Amendment violations,2 to Scalia, was plainly “circular, and hence
subjective and unpredictable.”3 That it was one of the most influential and oft-discussed decisions the Supreme Court has ever handed
down4 made little difference; regardless of whatever Justice Harlan
and his successors had said, the Fourth Amendment was, at its
heart, a protection against government interference with property
and had never been tied to “the quality or quantity of information
obtained.”5
Of course, Scalia’s property-centric reproach of Katz’s legacy was
far from unprecedented. In fact, legal scholars as well respected as
Judge Richard Posner of the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals had
been slinging the very same criticisms at the two-prong Katz test for
years.6 No matter one’s opinion of either of these jurists, or of the
ubiquitous “reasonable expectation of privacy”7 test, it would be
difficult to argue that it has been easy to apply in practice. And the
Court has, frustratingly, avoided directly addressing the issue.8
Given this, one might be tempted to join the textualists in their
1. 533 U.S. 27, 31-40 (2001).
2. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
3. Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 34.
4. See THE SOCIAL HISTORY OF CRIME AND PUNISHMENT IN AMERICA 578 (Wilbur R. Miller
ed., 2012) (noting the influence of the Katz decision).
5. See Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 37.
6. See Richard A. Posner, The Uncertain Protection of Privacy by the Supreme Court,
1979 SUP. CT. REV. 173, 188 (“[I]t is circular to say that there is no invasion of privacy unless
the individual whose privacy is invaded had a reasonable expectation of privacy; whether he
will or will not have such an expectation will depend on what the legal rule is.”). But see
generally Matthew B. Kugler & Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, The Myth of Fourth Amendment
Circularity, 84 U. CHI. L. REV. 1747, 1747 (2017) (“[P]opular privacy expectations are far more
stable than most judges and commentators have been assuming.”).
7. See Katz, 389 U.S. at 360 (Harlan, J., concurring).
8. Orin Kerr, Answering Justice Alito’s Question: What Makes an Expectation of Privacy
‘Reasonable’?, WASH. POST (May 28, 2014, 8:50 AM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/
news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2014/05/28/answering-justice-alitos-question-what-makes-anexpectation-of-privacy-reasonable/ [https://perma.cc/D9NR-KZAE].
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opinion that the old, easy-to-apply, property-based standard is
superior.
That does not mean, however, that the Katz test has led to
undesirable outcomes. In the age of modern technology, when the
government has access to surveillance methods allowing unprecedented intrusion into the privacies of life,9 Americans are more
conscious of their privacy interests than ever and less confident that
those interests will be protected.10 For all the valid criticisms that
may be levied against it, the Katz test, at the very least, offers an
avenue for confronting these concerns.
This is exactly what happened when the Court rendered its
decision in Carpenter v. United States, a landmark case extending
Fourth Amendment protection to historical cell site location
information (CSLI)—data generated, collected, and maintained by
cell phone service providers entirely outside the control of the
individuals the data describes.11 Reactions to Carpenter varied,12 but
it should be clear to anyone who understands the history and
context behind the Court’s decision that it represents a direct
repudiation of the notion that the appropriate Fourth Amendment
analysis is not “tied to measurement of the quality or quantity of
information obtained.”13 In fact, the Carpenter analysis was
explicitly tied to both the quantity and quality of the information at
stake.14
9. See Surveillance Technologies, ACLU, https://www.aclu.org/issues/privacy-technology/
surveillance-technologies [https://perma.cc/B7FW-S5HF].
10. Over 90 percent of American adults say that controlling what information is collected
about them and who collects it is important to them, but only 6 percent are “very confident”
that government agencies can keep their records private. Mary Madden & Lee Rainie,
Americans’ Attitudes About Privacy, Security and Surveillance, PEW RSCH. CTR. (May 20,
2015), https://www.pewresearch.org/internet/2015/05/20/americans-attitudes-about-privacysecurity-and-surveillance/ [https://perma.cc/V2DD-FSXY].
11. 138 S. Ct. 2206 (2018).
12. Compare Vania Mia Chaker, Your Spying Smartphone: Individual Privacy Is
Narrowly Strengthened in Carpenter v. United States, the U.S. Supreme Court’s Most Recent
Fourth Amendment Ruling, 22 J. TECH. L. & POL’Y 1, 16 (2018) (arguing that the risk of
intrusive government surveillance “may militate in favor of strengthened judicial oversight”),
with Alan Z. Rozenshtein, Fourth Amendment Reasonableness After Carpenter, 128 YALE
L.J.F. 943, 944, 950 (2019) (arguing that the categorical warrant requirement was a mistake,
and that Carpenter should be interpreted narrowly).
13. See Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 37 (2001).
14. See Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2223 (deciding based on the “depth, breadth, and comprehensive reach” of CSLI).
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But the problem remains unaddressed, as the Court has yet to
outline an all-encompassing approach to Fourth Amendment cases
of unwarranted government surveillance that do not involve physical trespass.15 These kinds of cases rarely overrule each other, so it
seems intuitive that the Court should be able to establish some
consistent through line. Yet, so far, it has not. This Note proposes
that it can be done, but only if the Court readily admits that the
Fourth Amendment no longer protects only property, but also information. The ultimate outcome of Carpenter, and of every case that
has adequately applied the Katz test, has been to keep certain
information out of government hands.
Somewhat ironically, this includes Kyllo. It is from the language
of Kyllo, originally intended to protect the traditionally privileged
space of the home,16 that this Note draws inspiration for its
proposed rule: absent probable cause, the Fourth Amendment
proscribes the government from obtaining information that could
not otherwise have been obtained without resorting to surveillance
technology or physically trespassing on private property. This
relatively simple standard, which can be called the obtainable information rule, unifies the collective holdings of post-Katz surveillance
cases and provides a flexible framework for future decisions and
new technologies.
In order to understand exactly how the obtainable information
standard works, it is important to place it in the historical context
of Fourth Amendment doctrine. Part I of this Note will examine the
history of Fourth Amendment doctrine in cases of government
surveillance since 1967 and leading up to Carpenter v. United
States, a landmark case of critical importance to this argument.
Part II will explore some of the theories proposed by academics for
reconstructing, clarifying, or otherwise refining Fourth Amendment
surveillance doctrine in a palatable manner, and will explain why
each is unsatisfactory in at least one regard. It will then formally
15. Cases of government surveillance that do involve trespass are, of course, much easier
to resolve. It is widely accepted that the Fourth Amendment, at a minimum, prevents the
government from physically searching your home or interfering with your personal effects
without a warrant. See Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 31. This understanding is what allowed United
States v. Jones to be resolved unanimously, despite the Court’s deep divide over the issue of
GPS surveillance. See infra notes 53-59 and accompanying text.
16. See Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 34.
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propose the obtainable information standard as a satisfactory
alternative, capable of unifying post-Katz surveillance jurisprudence
under a single theory. Part III will discuss the intersection between
the obtainable information standard and third-party doctrine, which
has become a subject of much discussion (and concern) following
Carpenter. It will explain how the third-party doctrine need not be
thrown out the window in order to accommodate the proposed
standard.
Finally, it is worth noting that the purpose of this Note is not to
argue that the obtainable information rule is the solution most
resonant with the original meaning of the Fourth Amendment.
Rather, the primary purpose of the rule is to synthesize the various
holdings of the Supreme Court since Katz into a single, easy-toapply standard. As Part II will explain, there is also good reason to
believe that it is the most functionally desirable rule, but this Note
does not address the contention that any or all of the Supreme
Court’s holdings since Katz were themselves unconstitutional and
should be overruled.
I. THE RELEVANT HISTORY OF FOURTH AMENDMENT DOCTRINE
In the first half of the twentieth century, the Supreme Court had
consistently taken a physical property-based approach to assessing
Fourth Amendment claims.17 Perhaps the most notable example of
this approach was Chief Justice Taft’s declaration in Olmstead v.
United States that the Fourth Amendment should be construed
narrowly enough to apply only to “material things—the person, the
house, his papers or his effects.”18 The Taft Court ultimately held
that warrantless wiretapping did not violate the Fourth Amendment, as there was no actual physical entry of the defendant’s house
or seizure of his belongings.19 Following Olmstead, the Court continued to apply this narrow construction of the Fourth Amendment,

17. The Fourth Amendment protects “persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures.” U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
18. 277 U.S. 438, 464 (1928).
19. Id. at 466.
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finding violations only when the government had physically intruded upon a defendant’s property.20
A. Katz and the “Reasonable Expectation of Privacy”
Then, in 1967, the Court dramatically expanded the realm of
Fourth Amendment doctrine with its opinion in Katz v. United
States.21 Charles Katz was convicted of transmitting wagering
information via telephone based on evidence gathered from warrantless FBI recordings of his phone conversations.22 The district
and appeals courts quickly rejected his Fourth Amendment claims
because the agents never actually intruded on any property Katz
owned.23 However, in a landmark decision, the Supreme Court
overruled Olmstead, rejecting the constitutional requirement of
physical trespass or seizure.24 Moreover, the Court took a step
further and declared that “the Fourth Amendment protects people,
not places,”25 effectively ending the era of the property-based
approach.26
The majority opinion in Katz offered no clear standard for courts
to utilize when assessing Fourth Amendment claims, but Justice
Harlan’s concurring opinion proposed a two-step test: (1) that the
defendant exhibited a subjective expectation of privacy, and (2) that
the expectation is “one that society is prepared to recognize as
reasonable.”27 Twelve years later, in Smith v. Maryland, a majority
of the Court adopted Harlan’s “reasonable expectation” test, and a
new era of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence was born.28
All was not said and done, however. Katz’s new interpretation of
the rights protected against unreasonable search and seizure created a slew of new questions, especially as technology continued to
20. See, e.g., Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 510-12 (1961); Trevor Burrus &
James Knight, Katz Nipped and Katz Cradled: Carpenter and the Evolving Fourth
Amendment, 2018 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 79, 83.
21. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
22. Id. at 353.
23. Id. at 348-49.
24. Id. at 353.
25. Id. at 351.
26. See Burrus & Knight, supra note 20, at 83.
27. Katz, 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring) (internal quotation marks omitted).
28. 442 U.S. 735, 740 (1979).
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rapidly advance near the beginning of the twenty-first century.
Foreseeing the danger that advancing technology poses to sources
of constitutionally protected private activity, the Supreme Court
chose to sharpen the focus of Katz while simultaneously reintroducing a traditional spatial context to the analysis.29
B. Ciraolo, Riley, and Public Exposure
A key qualification of the Court’s opinion in Katz was the idea of
public exposure: anything that has been “knowingly expose[d] to the
public” cannot reasonably be expected to be kept private.30 This
would seem self-evident and perhaps more relevant to the first
prong of the Katz test. After all, if Charles Katz had shouted the
details of his criminal enterprise across a crowded room, he could
hardly have claimed any subjective expectation that his words
would remain private. However, the concept of “public exposure”
has taken up a more permanent home in the second prong of the
Katz test, which the Court has used to prevent unsuccessful attempts to conceal criminal activity from creating constitutionally
protected interests.
This is exactly what happened in 1986, when the Court upheld
the conviction of Dante Ciraolo.31 Law enforcement had been tipped
off that Ciraolo was growing marijuana in his yard but were unable
to confirm their suspicion from ground level due to the ten-foot fence
enclosing his property.32 Without a search warrant, the police opted
instead to fly over Mr. Ciraolo’s property and surveil his yard from
a private airplane.33 The officers identified multiple marijuana
plants and obtained a search warrant for that evidence.34
The Supreme Court fully acknowledged Mr. Ciraolo’s subjective
expectation of privacy, exhibited by his efforts to conceal his yard

29. Andrew Guthrie Ferguson, The “Smart” Fourth Amendment, 102 CORNELL L. REV.
547, 588 (2017). For more on the context and reasoning behind the Kyllo decision, see
generally David A. Sklansky, Back to the Future: Kyllo, Katz, and Common Law, 72 MISS. L.J.
143 (2002).
30. Katz, 389 U.S. at 351.
31. California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 210 (1986).
32. Id. at 209.
33. Id.
34. Id.
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from prying eyes.35 However, even an intent “to conceal assertedly
private activity” is meaningless in cases of public exposure.36
According to the Court, the determinative fact was that any person
flying in publicly navigable airspace on a commercial flight or
private airplane could have “glanced down” and seen exactly the
same thing that the officers saw.37 In other words, exposure to the
public is a hard line drawn when an effect or activity is located in a
space that could theoretically be observed from a public vantage
point, whether or not it actually was observed.
The Court affirmed as much in Florida v. Riley, a similar case
involving police use of a helicopter to surveil the interior of a dilapidated greenhouse from four hundred feet above.38 The plurality
opinion upheld the conviction largely based on the fact that the
helicopter never left public airspace as defined by FAA regulations,
meaning any person in a helicopter could have lawfully made the
same observations.39 Justice O’Connor’s concurring opinion was
hesitant to rely on such regulations, but would have instead inquired whether members of the public travel in helicopters at that
altitude “with sufficient regularity” so as to render any expectation
of privacy unreasonable.40 In any case, Riley’s conviction was upheld
because the marijuana he was growing in his greenhouse had been
exposed to the public in the sense that any member of the public
could presumably have made such an observation without breaking
any laws or acting in an irregular manner.41 Mr. Riley’s subjective
expectation that his greenhouse would remain private, and the fact
that no member of the public (other than police officers) subverted
that expectation, were found to be inconsequential.42
What arose from these cases was a definitive limit on the scope
of the Katz test—and perhaps a necessary one given its potential
nebulousness. The Court effectively used the “public exposure”

35. Id. at 211.
36. Id. at 212 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Oliver v. United States, 466
U.S. 170, 181-83 (1984)).
37. Id. at 213-14.
38. See 488 U.S. 445, 448 (1989).
39. Id. at 450-51.
40. Id. at 454 (O’Connor, J., concurring).
41. Id. at 450-51 (plurality opinion).
42. See id. at 451.
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exception to narrow Katz’s “reasonable expectation” prong so as to
apply only to effects and activity which had been kept completely
private from all potential public observation.43 Along with the open
fields doctrine44 and the third-party doctrine, which will be discussed later in this Note,45 Ciraolo and Riley demonstrate the
Court’s willingness in the late 1980s to poke holes in personal expectations of privacy using theoretical societal reasonableness.
C. Recent Cases Involving Modern Technology
By the dawn of the twenty-first century, it became clear that such
legal hole-poking posed a serious threat to traditional constitutionally protected spaces. In Kyllo v. United States, the Court considered
the warrantless use of a thermal imaging device to detect heat
signatures emanating from a suspect’s home.46 The Court rejected
the government’s argument that these heat waves were not subject
to a reasonable expectation of privacy, finding instead that any
technology that obtained “information regarding the interior of the
home that could not otherwise have been obtained without physical
intrusion” constituted a search.47 This line of reasoning allowed the
Court to emphasize the continued relevance of constitutionally
protected spaces under the Fourth Amendment (such as homes)
while simultaneously preserving the underlying Katz objective of
43. This principle is perhaps best illuminated by the Supreme Court’s 1984 decision in
Karo v. United States, 468 U.S. 705 (1984). In Karo, the Court held that the use of a
surreptitiously placed electronic tracking beeper to monitor the movement of a five-gallon can
of chemicals purchased by a suspected criminal violated the Fourth Amendment. Id. at 714.
What made this decision particularly remarkable was the Court’s decision in United States
v. Knotts only one year before, a case involving the use of a similar tracking beeper placed in
a can of chemicals, in which the Court held that there was not a Fourth Amendment violation.
460 U.S. 276, 285 (1983). The distinction, as explained by Justice White in the Karo majority
opinion, came down to the potential for simple “visual surveillance.” See Karo, 468 U.S. at
714. In Knotts, law enforcement had used the beeper to track the defendant along public
thoroughfares to the area where his cabin was located, activity that might just as well “have
been observed by the naked eye.” Id. at 713-14. In Karo, on the other hand, the beeper was
used to track movement within a private home, a place “not open to visual surveillance.” Id.
at 714.
44. See generally Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170 (1984); United States v. Dunn, 480
U.S. 294 (1987).
45. See infra Part III.
46. 533 U.S. 27, 29-30 (2001).
47. Id. at 34 (internal quotation marks omitted).
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not “leav[ing] the homeowner at the mercy of advancing technology.”48 Critically, the Court rejected the “proposition that
inference insulates a search”; that is, simply because the officers
had to infer additional conclusions from the heat data gathered did
not make the data any less private.49
Justice Scalia’s majority opinion in Kyllo is plainly critical of the
Katz test, or at least of the way in which it is worded. Before even
attempting to apply it, Scalia uses the words “circular,” “subjective,”
and “unpredictable” to describe the “expectation of privacy that
society is prepared to recognize as reasonable.”50 This problem
springs from the fact that, in Scalia’s opinion, the Fourth Amendment “has never been tied to ... the quality or quantity of information obtained.”51 The government’s use of thermal imaging was
unconstitutional not because the actual activity observed was
private in nature but because activity that takes place within the
walls of the home is necessarily protected by the Fourth Amendment.52 In many ways, this can be seen as an attempt to refocus the
Court’s Fourth Amendment doctrine on specific constitutionally
protected areas—what might be called a property-based approach.
A decade after Kyllo, the Supreme Court ruled on another
landmark Fourth Amendment case, United States v. Jones.53 Jones
argued that the government’s warrantless use of location data
gathered from a GPS device planted on his car constituted an
unreasonable search.54 The Court ultimately ruled in favor of
Jones, although on admittedly mixed grounds.55 Once again, Justice Scalia wrote the majority opinion, taking the traditional approach and arguing that the defendant’s rights were violated
when the officers “physically occupied private property for the
purposes of obtaining information.”56 Justice Alito, joined by three
other Justices, concurred in the judgment but explicitly rejected

48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.

Id. at 35.
Id. at 36.
Id. at 34.
Id. at 37.
See id. at 34.
565 U.S. 400 (2012).
Id. at 402-03.
See id. at 413.
Id. at 404.

2021]

THE QUALITATIVE FOURTH AMENDMENT

1737

the majority’s pre-Katz approach.57 Instead, Alito argued that the
long-term use of GPS monitoring to track a person’s precise movement impinges on that person’s reasonable expectation of privacy.58
Justice Sotomayor was the lone voice in agreement with both Scalia
and Alito.59 As such, a five-member majority of the Court agreed
that the precise details of a person’s location over a period of time
are subject to a “reasonable expectation of privacy” and therefore deserving of Fourth Amendment protection.
The Court offered a more unified perspective in 2014 when it
considered the much-discussed case of Riley v. California.60 The
issue in Riley was narrower than that in previous cases: merely the
ability of the government to search, without a warrant, data on a
cell phone recovered from a person during a lawful arrest.61
However, the implications were no less important. The Court held
that, unlike other objects that might be kept on an arrestee’s person,
“[c]ell phones differ in both a quantitative and a qualitative sense.”62
Unlike a wallet or paper document, modern cell phones can hold
vast quantities of personal images, private communications, and
personal information that “is not physically limited in the same
way.”63 The Court reasoned that to allow unwarranted searches of
such information would be to allow unreasonable government
intrusion into “the privacies of life.”64 Interestingly, the majority
made no mention of Katz in its opinion, despite the clear connection.
D. Carpenter v. United States in Context
Carpenter, therefore, was only the most recent in a long line of
cases since Katz cyclically broadening and refining the scope of
57. Id. at 426 (Alito, J., concurring) (“[T]he Court’s reliance on the law of trespass will
present particularly vexing problems in cases involving surveillance that is carried out by
making electronic, as opposed to physical, contact with the item to be tracked.”).
58. Id. at 430.
59. See id. at 414 (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (“When the government physically invades
personal property to gather information, a search occurs.... Nonetheless, as Justice Alito
notes, physical intrusion is now unnecessary to many forms of surveillance.”).
60. 573 U.S. 373 (2014).
61. See id. at 378.
62. Id. at 393.
63. Id. at 394.
64. Id. at 403 (quoting Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 630 (1886)).
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Fourth Amendment protection; it was against this background
that the Court rendered its decision. And while some scholars
heralded the Court’s holding in Carpenter as revolutionary,65 others
wondered why it took the Court so long.66 Whatever the case, it
should be noted that the key concerns about the government’s
access to private information, made possible by technological
advances discussed in Jones and Riley v. California, underpin the
outcome of Carpenter.67 The same could be said about the technological equivalence principle adopted in Kyllo.68 This makes Carpenter
the latest installment in a trilogy (or perhaps a tetralogy?) of
decisions confronting the interplay between the Fourth Amendment
and continuously advancing surveillance technology.69 For these
reasons, it is important to keep context in mind when considering
Carpenter.
1. The Facts of the Case
Over a period of four months in 2011, a group of armed men
robbed a series of Radio Shack and T-Mobile stores in Detroit.70
Police officers arrested four men in connection with the robberies,
one of whom admitted to participating in the crime spree and provided the names and phone numbers of fifteen accomplices.71 Using
this information, prosecutors procured court orders under the
Stored Communications Act compelling two wireless carriers to disclose cell site location information (CSLI) data for several suspects,
including Timothy Carpenter.72

65. See, e.g., Paul Ohm, The Many Revolutions of Carpenter, 32 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 357,
358 (2019) (“Carpenter works a series of revolutions in Fourth Amendment law.”).
66. See, e.g., Susan Freiwald & Stephen Wm. Smith, The Carpenter Chronicle: A NearPerfect Surveillance, 132 HARV. L. REV. 205, 231-32 (2018) (arguing that “it is sobering to
consider” how long it took the Court to correct “a widespread error that enabled constitutional
violations on an epic scale”).
67. Chaker, supra note 12, at 7-8.
68. See Ohm, supra note 65, at 394-95.
69. See Freiwald & Smith, supra note 66, at 216.
70. Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2212 (2018).
71. Id.
72. Id.
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CSLI is, in essence, all the information that cell phones relay to
the nearby cell towers.73 Wireless carriers routinely store customers’
historical CSLI, which can triangulate a cell phone’s location at any
given time.74 The Stored Communications Act, originally enacted in
1986 as Title II of the Electronic Communications Privacy Act, permits disclosure of such data upon a showing of “reasonable grounds
to believe” that it is “relevant and material to an ongoing criminal
investigation.”75 Of course, this standard is notably lower than that
required to obtain a warrant, which requires probable cause.76
Altogether, the government procured 12,898 location points cataloguing Carpenter’s movements over a period of four months.77
Before trial, Carpenter moved to suppress the CSLI, but the district
court denied his motion.78 At trial, the government used the CSLI
to place Carpenter’s phone near four of the robberies.79 Based
largely on this evidence, Carpenter was convicted of all but one of
the charges and sentenced to more than one hundred years in prison.80 The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction, and
the United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve a
circuit court split on the issue.81
2. The Court’s Holding
The opinion of the Court, authored by Chief Justice Roberts,
began its analysis by reaffirming the Court’s commitment to upholding the “reasonable expectation of privacy” standard adopted in
Katz.82 However, the Court chose to go more in-depth by using a
multifactor analysis which, although not explicitly listed in the

73. Stephanie Lacambra, Cell Phone Location Tracking or CSLI: A Guide for Criminal
Defense Attorneys, ELEC. FRONTIER FOUND. (Oct. 30, 2017), https://www.eff.org/files/2017/10/
30/cell_phone_location_information_one_pager_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/M2MD-R6D6].
74. Id.
75. 18 U.S.C. § 2703(d).
76. Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2221.
77. Id. at 2212.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 2212-13.
80. Id. at 2213.
81. Id.
82. See id.
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opinion, was central to the holding.83 While each of these factors,
including duration, scope, and intrusiveness, informed the Court’s
ultimate decision, none were dispositive on their own.84 It was, at its
heart, a balancing test—much to the chagrin of the dissenters.85
In sum, the Court found that by acquiring his CSLI, the government impinged Carpenter’s reasonable expectation of privacy and
therefore committed a search under the meaning of the Fourth
Amendment.86 Katz and Jones taken together, according to the
Court, stood for the proposition that people can maintain a reasonable expectation of privacy in their activities even when those
activities are performed outside the sanctuary of their home.87
Likewise, Riley v. California and Kyllo addressed the need for
Fourth Amendment doctrine to grow and change in proportion to
the changing nature of technology.88 Therefore, even an interpretation of the Constitution that demanded “preservation of that degree
of privacy against government that existed when the Fourth
Amendment was adopted” requires a somewhat flexible approach.89
The Court cited the five-Justice majority in Jones for the proposition that society fully expects that law enforcement agents would
not or could not “catalogue every single movement of an individual[ ],” suggesting that to allow the government access to CSLI would
contravene that decision.90 After all, taken together, Carpenter’s
CSLI provided “an all-encompassing record of ” his location and
movement over a long period.91 The Court seized on both the sensitive nature of the CSLI and the fact that it provided “near perfect
surveillance,” far removed from the abilities of a constable on foot
or other eighteenth-century equivalent.92
After finding a search under the Fourth Amendment, the Court
quickly affirmed the general presumption that warrants or warrant
83. Freiwald & Smith, supra note 66, at 219.
84. See id. at 219-21; Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2213-14 (“[N]o single rubric definitively
resolves which expectations of privacy are entitled to protection.”).
85. See Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2231-32 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
86. Id. at 2223 (majority opinion).
87. Id. at 2217.
88. See id. at 2218-19.
89. Id. at 2214 (quoting Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 34 (2001)).
90. Id. at 2217; see also supra notes 53-59 and accompanying text.
91. Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2217.
92. Id. at 2218; see also Freiwald & Smith, supra note 66, at 221.

2021]

THE QUALITATIVE FOURTH AMENDMENT

1741

exceptions are required for Fourth Amendment searches.93 Thus, a
revolution in Fourth Amendment doctrine was born.94 Or so it would
seem.
Though the Carpenter decision may appear unprecedented at first
glance,95 it actually marks a perfectly logical and predictable development in Fourth Amendment doctrine. In fact, the Supreme
Court’s entire post-Katz nontrespassory surveillance jurisprudence,
as jumbled as it may seem, could very well be reduced to a few nonconflicting principles. Katz introduced the principle that expectations of privacy are more important than physical spaces. Ciraolo,
Riley, Karo, and other cases from the 1980s defined the limit of
these expectations, drawing the line at potential public exposure.
Kyllo, Jones, and other cases from this century have demonstrated
that advancing technology does not lower the bar for public
exposure. As Part II will discuss, in the correct context, a path can
be traced through these cases that leads right to Carpenter and
gives us a roadmap for the future.
II. FINDING A THROUGH LINE IN FOURTH AMENDMENT DOCTRINE
It would seem important to find a consistent direction taken by
the Supreme Court on Fourth Amendment surveillance issues, especially given that major government surveillance cases since Katz
have avoided overruling each other.96 However, the only explicitly
enumerated holding common to all these cases is the “reasonable
expectation of privacy,” a guideline which is, at best, “circular” and
“subjective.”97
For the purposes of this discussion, it is important to distinguish
between traditional searches or seizures and government surveillance, which only became a Fourth Amendment issue after Katz.
The dismissal of the traditional property-based approach was necessary in Katz to account for nontrespassory surveillance, which can

93. Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2221.
94. Ohm, supra note 65, at 358.
95. The dissenters certainly thought so. See Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2230 (Kennedy, J.,
dissenting).
96. See supra Part I.
97. See Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 34 (2001).
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be just as violative of a person’s privacy as physical searches.98
Government entry into constitutionally protected spaces or seizure
of personal effects without a warrant or probable cause has always
been considered violative of the Fourth Amendment.99 The major
Supreme Court cases since Katz listed above deal almost exclusively
with nontrespassory surveillance, which should be the primary
focus of any modern Fourth Amendment theory, and is therefore the
focus of this Note.
A. The Many Unsatisfactory Candidates
Many potential candidates for an all-encompassing theory of
Fourth Amendment rights claim to effectively unify the post-Katz
doctrine. Some have been explicitly proposed, while others are
implicit in the Court’s opinions. However, most leave unsatisfactory
holes in the doctrine or else fail to account for all the Court’s prior
decisions. Ideally, a unifying theory would include and account for
every currently in-force Supreme Court decision without necessitating that any of them be overruled.
Using Carpenter and Kyllo as a lens, it might be tempting to defer
to the Court’s historical prerogative to preserve “that degree of
privacy against government that existed when the Fourth Amendment was adopted.”100 This approach has some appeal, especially
because the holding of Kyllo was, at least in part, motivated by the
fact that when the Bill of Rights was adopted, only physical trespass
would have allowed the same level of observation of activity inside
the home as a thermal sensor does today.101 Similarly, as Chief Justice Roberts pointed out in Carpenter, no individual investigator or
team of investigators could possibly hope to gather such extensive
location information as was provided by CSLI, a very recent technological development.102 Using the “at the time the Fourth Amendment was adopted” standard would certainly go above and beyond

98.
99.
100.
101.
102.

See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 353 (1967).
See, e.g., Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 621 (1886).
Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2214 (quoting Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 34).
See Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 34.
See Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2218.
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the call for protecting individuals from the threat of modern surveillance technology encroaching on private life.
But such an approach does not square with the Court’s decisions
in Ciraolo or Florida v. Riley—or even, quite frankly, the Katz test.
Airplanes and helicopters were certainly not around at the time the
Framers adopted the Fourth Amendment. One could easily conclude
that aerial surveillance of any kind exceeds the degree of privacy
that existed when the Fourth Amendment was adopted. Had Mr.
Ciraolo constructed his ten-foot perimeter fence in 1791, he would
have effectively ensured that the contents of his yard would remain
private—and could reasonably have expected so.103 It seems, then,
that the historical standard is less of a bright-line rule and more of
a general expression of society’s expectations of privacy. The Court
in Carpenter admitted as much, using “historical understandings”
only to “inform[ ]” the analysis which has “no single rubric.”104 In
essence, the historical standard is just a rewording of what “society
is prepared to recognize as reasonable”105 and therefore no less
circular.
Another approach might be to refocus on the “knowingly expose[d]” language from Katz,106 as the Court did in Ciraolo and
Florida v. Riley.107 The language from those opinions seems to suggest that this was indeed the direction the Rehnquist Court hoped
to push Fourth Amendment jurisprudence.108 It would be a relatively simple rule that could (at least theoretically) refine the Katz
test without abandoning it. What has been knowingly exposed to
observation from any public vantage point is necessarily not subject
to a reasonable expectation of privacy. Rather than threaten the
holding of Katz, such a rule would merely take the guesswork out of
the second prong. Furthermore, it would imply that activity which
has not been exposed to the public, such as activity within the walls
103. See California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 209 (1986).
104. Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2213-14 (citing Carroll v. United States, 67 U.S. 132, 149
(1925)).
105. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
106. See id. at 351.
107. See Ciraolo, 476 U.S. at 213; Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445, 449 (1989).
108. See Riley, 488 U.S. at 449 (“As a general proposition, the police may see what may be
seen ‘from a public vantage point where [they have] a right to be.’” (alteration in original)
(quoting Ciraolo, 476 U.S. at 213)).
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of the home or documented on a personal cell phone, would be
protected by the Fourth Amendment, complying with the Court’s
later holdings in Kyllo and Riley v. California.
However, such a rule is plainly not conducive to the holdings in
Jones or Carpenter. The legal challenges posed by location-tracking
technology are relatively new, but they are no less indicative of
Fourth Amendment concerns.109 Unwarranted CSLI and GPS tracking data represent a “seismic shift[ ]”110 in surveillance technology
that allows the government to intrude on the “privacies of life”111 in
ways never before imagined. Surely, Mr. Carpenter’s movements
over those four months were exposed to the public in the sense that
they took place in public spaces where he could have been observed
by anyone who happened to be there.112 Had there been a police
officer present at any one of the robberies, or all four, who had seen
Mr. Carpenter and positively identified him, this information would
certainly not be protected by the Fourth Amendment. Rather,
something about the sum total of the information makes it constitutionally protected, regardless of the fact that all of the activity in
both Jones and Carpenter was technically exposed to public view.
Of course, yet another proposal is to return to a property-centric
interpretation of the Fourth Amendment. This has drawn support
from certain academic writers, such as Trevor Burrus and James
Knight, who believe that clearer jurisprudence based on property
law can help untangle the confusing legacy of the Katz test.113 The
idea is that the kinds of property protected by the Fourth Amendment can be expanded into areas such as CSLI without resorting to
nebulous and highly subjective interpretations of reasonableness.114
While continuing to allow the government to carry out naked-eye
surveillance without trespassing, this approach can still be said to
square with Kyllo and Riley v. California, because the interior of the
home or personal cell phone is included in those “constitutionally
protected area[s]” necessarily subject to a legitimate expectation of
109. See Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2223.
110. Id. at 2219.
111. Id. at 2217 (quoting Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373, 403 (2014)).
112. See id. (“A person does not surrender all Fourth Amendment protection by venturing
into the public sphere.”).
113. See Burrus & Knight, supra note 20, at 110-11.
114. See id.
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privacy.115 It would certainly fit right in with Justice Scalia’s admonition that Fourth Amendment analysis does not turn on the
nature of the information gathered.116 In fact, the property-based
approach could be construed to include all the Court’s post-Katz
decisions, so long as the definition of property is loose enough to
include intellectual property and the like.
However, something about the property-based approach does not
conform with the spirit of the Fourth Amendment, or at least not
how it has been construed in the past half-century. One might very
well suggest that the determinative issue in Carpenter was the
property at stake—namely the CSLI data itself.117 But from Mr.
Carpenter’s perspective, and seemingly the Court’s perspective as
well, that was not the case.118 After all, Carpenter had no interest
in the physical data itself; it would be hard to imagine any individual claiming actual ownership over the ones and zeros that make up
CSLI. Rather, what infringed upon his expectation of privacy were
the inferences drawn from the data.119 Mr. Carpenter likely had no
knowledge that this data existed before it was used to convict him,
and he almost certainly would have preferred that it never existed
at all. Therefore, it can hardly be said that he had a traditional
property interest in the CSLI. His interest was rooted in keeping
the government from inferring (via CSLI or otherwise) the details
of his location over an extended period.120 This is not property, it is
information.
The crux of the issue is that CSLI falls so far outside the common
understanding of “property” that it threatens to render the term
meaningless. CSLI is created, managed, and controlled by cell phone
service providers, not individual customers.121 In order to fit Carpenter within the scope of the property-based approach, one would
have to argue that individuals have a legitimate property interest
in any data that describes them or their activities, regardless of
115. See Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 34 (2001) (quoting Silverman v. United States,
365 U.S. 505, 512 (1961)).
116. See id. at 37.
117. See Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2211-12.
118. See id. at 2218-19.
119. See id.
120. See id.
121. See id. at 2211-12.
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whether they had a hand in creating or managing it. This is, of
course, an unreasonable rule. For instance, an individual cannot
possibly be said to have a property interest in another’s diary entry
that describes her or in a newspaper article that discusses her activities. She may have a privacy interest in these sources, but it is
a privacy interest that is separate and distinct from any legitimate
property interest.
The oft-repeated holding in Katz that “the Fourth Amendment
protects people, not places”122 is indicative of the notion that the
Court’s post-1967 jurisprudence has really protected information
and knowledge at least as much, if not more so, than property. The
facts of Katz reflect this. It was not the location from which Mr.
Katz was making a phone call that was protected by the Constitution, much less whatever physical properties a phone call can be
said to exhibit.123 What was protected was the content of the conversation, that is, information.124
Even in Kyllo, the very case in which Justice Scalia declared
“quality or quantity of information” irrelevant to the Fourth Amendment analysis,125 it was information being protected rather than
property. The Kyllo Court’s holding that activity and effects within
the home are necessarily subject to Fourth Amendment protection
simply generalizes a category of information that is protected.126
Contrary to Justice Scalia’s characterization of the issue, the fact
that the activity in Kyllo took place on a traditionally protected
property was only a precondition for determining the quality of the
information at stake.127 The effective outcome of Kyllo is that activities and effects within certain spatial contexts (namely, the home)
have been determined to exhibit the quality of constitutionally
protected private activity, regardless of what that activity actually
is.

122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.

Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967).
See id. at 354.
See id.
See Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 37 (2001).
See id. at 34.
See id.
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Similarly, in Carpenter, it was both the quantity and quality of
the information at stake that led the Court to its decision.128 This
reality is not lost on academic commentators129 and certainly was
not lost on the dissenting Justices.130 Although a property-based
approach might be shaped and squeezed into the mold of post-Katz
Fourth Amendment doctrine, it does not address the heart of the
issue, and it certainly does not account for the direction that the
Court seems to be headed.
B. An Effective Information-Based Approach
Given the case law discussed above,131 the most appropriate allencompassing Fourth Amendment theory in cases of warrantless
government surveillance would take into account the private nature
of certain kinds of information, without barring the government
from observing or learning what any member of the public already
lawfully could observe or learn (that is, what has been publicly
exposed132). Such a theory would look something like this: absent
probable cause, the government is barred from obtaining any information that could not otherwise be obtained without resorting
to surveillance technology or trespassing. Such a rule is relatively
simple, accounts for all post-Katz holdings, and provides a workable roadmap for future decisions.
1. The Obtainable Information Approach as a Through Line
for Post-Katz Fourth Amendment Cases
It is easy to see how this proposed standard would encompass the
holdings of Carpenter and Jones, given the “comprehensive reach”
of the information at issue in those cases.133 As pointed out by Chief
128. See Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2223 (2018) (deciding based on the
“depth, breadth, and comprehensive reach” of CSLI).
129. See, e.g., Evan Caminker, Location Tracking and Digital Data: Can Carpenter Build
a Stable Privacy Doctrine?, 2018 SUP. CT. REV. 411, 445-46.
130. See Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2224 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (“[T]he Court [has] unhing[ed] Fourth Amendment doctrine from the property-based concepts that have long
grounded [it].”).
131. See supra Part I.
132. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967).
133. See Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2223.
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Justice Roberts, no individual person could possibly hope to compile
an exhaustive account of a suspect’s every movement over a period
of multiple days, let alone several months.134 Therefore, it is not the
public exposure of the activity generally that matters but instead
the public availability of the cumulative weight of the information,
and the inferences drawn therefrom. The information at issue in
Carpenter, as revealed by the CSLI, was only available to the government by using the CSLI technology itself, or some similar
location tracking technology.135 There is simply no way that such a
vast quantity of information could be obtained otherwise. As such,
it violates the rule and should be held unconstitutional. Although
the Jones Court ultimately ruled on physical trespass grounds,136
the same principles can apply to the location data in that case.
Moreover, a five-Justice majority would have ruled in favor of Jones
even if the police had not trespassed.
Riley v. California too fits nicely into the obtainable information
standard. It can hardly be said that the personal information kept
on a cell phone is available to anyone who does not either hack into
the phone electronically or physically seize the phone itself.137
As discussed earlier, the Kyllo holding is essentially a qualitybased analysis of information in certain spatial contexts.138 In any
case, a plain application of the obtainable information standard
would yield the same result, and for largely the same reasons.139
Information gathered from observing activity hidden within the
walls of a private home is inaccessible, except by trespassing or
using surveillance technology. That is, after all, exactly what happened in Kyllo.140 Shifting the focus of the analysis from the location
to the type of information at stake does not change the outcome but
refines it. The information in Kyllo, as is the case with all information about activity and effects within the walls of a home, should

134. Id. at 2218.
135. See id.
136. See United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 404-05 (2012).
137. See generally Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373 (2014).
138. See supra notes 125-26 and accompanying text.
139. It was, in fact, the language and reasoning of the Kyllo holding that served as
inspiration for the obtainable information standard. See Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27,
34 (2001).
140. See id. at 29-30.
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be protected from the government precisely because the spatial
context prevents all nonsurveillance and nontrespass methods of
obtaining it.
Moving further back in the Fourth Amendment timeline, Ciraolo
and Florida v. Riley easily fall within the obtainable information
standard as well. Those decisions hinged on the fact that a person
occupying public airspace—whether or not they were trying to
surveil the defendant’s property—could see anything and everything
the officers themselves saw.141 Neither surveillance technology nor
trespass was required to observe the marijuana growing in Mr.
Ciraolo’s yard or Mr. Riley’s greenhouse, only an airplane or
helicopter.142 Therefore, the information at stake, namely that the
defendants were growing marijuana in those locations, was obtainable without breaking the rules of the obtainable information
standard. Such observation would therefore be held constitutional,
consistent with the Court’s opinions.
The beauty of the obtainable information standard is that it gets
to the heart of the reasonable expectation of privacy test as laid out
by Justice Harlan,143 without compromising any of the values or
policy concerns enumerated by the Court since Katz. The spirit of
the two-pronged test is the preservation of private information, and
the direction of the Court since adopting the test is best encapsulated by preventing the government from obtaining information
otherwise unobtainable without resorting to surveillance technology
or physical trespass.
2. The Information-Based Approach as a Roadmap for the
Future
As technology continues to advance, the threats it poses to personal privacy will no doubt grow as well. One major problem with
the property-based or public exposure standards is that they generally fail to account for the “seismic shifts” in technology that allow

141. See California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 213-14 (1986); Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445,
451-52 (1989).
142. See Ciraolo, 476 U.S. at 213-14; Riley, 488 U.S. at 451-52.
143. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring).
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the government to peer into formerly private areas of life.144 The
Court’s Fourth Amendment theory should account for such shifts by
preventing the government from using them to unduly intrude into
private life. At the same time, the Court should not overly burden
the government by preventing police from obtaining information
that is accessible via the use of common modern technology that
serves nonsurveillance purposes.
a. The Continuing Relevance of the Trespass Qualification
This Note certainly does not argue that property interests play no
part in Fourth Amendment surveillance cases. Scalia’s contention
in Kyllo that the interior of a home is necessarily protected by the
Fourth Amendment is not wrong, it merely misrepresents why that
protection is necessary.145 Activities and effects that are placed
within the walls of a house are not magically transformed into the
privacies of life merely by virtue of being there. They are protected
because we expect them to be protected. There is nothing special
about the interior of a house per se, except that the owner of the
house exercises control over who may enter it and therefore exercises de facto control over the flow of information from within.
As such, it is appropriate to keep the “trespass” qualification from
Kyllo attached to the obtainable information standard. In other
words, if the only way information can be obtained is by trespassing
on private property, then that information is protected by the
Fourth Amendment. This is a sound principle, but it is incomplete.
It does not account for the threat of advanced surveillance technology which does not require any such trespass.
b. Defining “Surveillance Technology”
As already noted, the obtainable information standard would effectively prevent the government from using surveillance technology
to obtain information that could not otherwise have been obtained.146 This would account for any future technological developments
144. See Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2219 (2018).
145. See supra notes 125-26 and accompanying text.
146. See supra Part II.B.1.
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providing access to information that was not already exposed in
some way. Likewise, the enumerated concerns of the Carpenter
Court would be readily addressed.147 The only potential hurdle for
future courts to consider would be the legal definition of “surveillance technology.”
This determination could likely be made on a case-by-case basis
without much trouble, but a recommended starting place should be
as follows: surveillance technology is any technology used to acquire
information that could not casually be acquired. As general as this
may seem, it provides an important distinction, so far as the case
law discussed in this Note is concerned.
Consider the airplane and helicopter at issue in Ciraolo and
Florida v. Riley, respectively.148 In each of those cases, the Court
relied on the fact that any person in an aerial vehicle occupying
public airspace could have observed the illegal activity, regardless
of whether they were trying to surveil the property below them.149
A passenger on a commercial flight that happened to be passing
overhead could easily have “glanced down” and seen everything the
police did.150 As such, the information at stake in Ciraolo and
Florida v. Riley, namely that the defendants were growing marijuana on their property, could have been casually acquired.151 That
law enforcement used this technology specifically for the purpose of
surveillance is irrelevant. What matters is that the information
gathered was not otherwise unobtainable.
On the other hand, technology such as the thermal sensor used in
Kyllo would clearly fall under the definition of “surveillance technology.”152 Information about the interior of a house is unobtainable
without trespassing into the home or using some kind of senseenhancing technology.153 Likewise, such information cannot be casually acquired in the same way as information about the contents
of a fenced-in yard. Another way to think about this distinction is
147.
148.
(1989).
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.

See Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2219.
See California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 209 (1986); Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445, 448
See Ciraolo, 476 U.S. at 213-14; Riley, 488 U.S. at 450-51.
See Ciraolo, 476 U.S. at 213-14.
See id. at 209; Riley, 488 U.S. at 448.
See Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 29-30 (2001).
See id. at 34.
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to consider whether a person could acquire the information at issue
without actively trying to do so. Using a thermal imaging device, or
any other device capable of penetrating the walls of Kyllo’s home,
would necessarily require an active intent. It would be absurd to
propose that any person might have “glanced” into a thermal
imaging device aimed at Kyllo’s house and seen everything the
police had seen without meaning to see what was inside his house.
One key aspect of this definition of “surveillance technology” is
that it hinges on the nature of the information, as well as the nature
of the technology. Any legal definition of “surveillance technology”
that rests only on the nature of the technology itself would lead to
undesirable outcomes. For example, most people would likely agree
that a high-resolution camera mounted on a government satellite
used to monitor individuals is a “surveillance technology” by its own
standards. But what if such a satellite were used to photograph a
suspect who walked through a public park in the middle of the day?
Regardless of the nature of the technology used to take the photographs, it would be at odds with the Supreme Court’s post-Katz
jurisprudence to say that the suspect had any legitimate privacy
interest in the fact that he was in that particular public place on
that particular day. Any person (or law enforcement officer) who
happened to be in the park that day could have seen him without
actively trying to monitor his whereabouts. In other words, the
information could have been casually acquired.
In a sense, the Supreme Court has already drawn this distinction
with its dual holdings in Knotts and Karo, two cases that involved
the use of nearly identical electronic tracking beepers to monitor a
suspect’s movement.154 Although the Court expressed its opinion in
Karo through the language of traditional property protection, the
critical difference between these two cases was that the beeper in
Knotts was used only to track movement through public thoroughfares.155 In Karo, the beeper was used to track movement within a
private residence.156 As such, the information at stake in Knotts
could have been easily acquired by any officer who tailed the defendant on that day, whereas the information in Karo could only have
154. See supra note 43.
155. See United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 281 (1983).
156. United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 714 (1984).
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been acquired by trespassing had it not been for the use of the
beeper technology. The Knotts/Karo distinction is a good example
of how the exact same technology can satisfy the proposed definition
of “surveillance technology” in some cases but not in others, depending on the nature of the information it has been used to acquire.
Notably, such a definition would be ambiguous when applied to
simple quasi-surveillance equipment such as binoculars. A strong
case could be made that activity that is observable only using
binoculars or similar visual-enhancement technologies cannot be
casually acquired. However, people frequently use binoculars for
purposes other than surveillance. The resolution to such a case
would rest on a factual determination of the likelihood that a
person, using some manner of simple visual-enhancement technology for a purpose other than surveillance of the activity or property
in question, could have obtained the information at issue casually,
without active intent.
This ambiguity is intentional, as society’s general expectation of
privacy concerning such surveillance is unclear. Any definition of
“surveillance technology” as the phrase is used in the obtainable
information standard would need to be flexible, so as to align with
the public’s changing understanding of what can reasonably be
expected to remain private. In any case, the legal definition proposed above would become an issue only in the narrow set of cases
in which the government surveilled an individual and gathered
information that could only have been acquired casually using some
form of common quasi-surveillance sense-enhancing technology in
a nonsurveillance manner. No such case has yet presented itself to
the Supreme Court.
III. THE THORNY THIRD-PARTY DOCTRINE
After the Katz decision shifted the focus of Fourth Amendment
inquiries away from physical property,157 a paradox of sorts arose
when it came to the legal interpretation of what one could reasonably expect to keep private. If Fourth Amendment searches were no
longer tied to physical spaces the defendant occupies or owns, then

157. See supra notes 21-28 and accompanying text.
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could a defendant claim a “reasonable expectation of privacy”
regarding objects or information in the possession of another
person? From a law enforcement perspective, this would be problematic: it would allow criminals to use third-party services to
commit crimes without exposing themselves to the public spaces
open to government surveillance.158 The Court’s solution to this
conundrum was simply to make such an outlet wholly unavailable.
In other words, “[u]sing a third party [will] not change the overall
level of Fourth Amendment protection.”159 This standard came into
being through a fusion of two cases wrestling with the application
of Katz in the 1970s and would come to be known as the SmithMiller standard.
A. The Smith-Miller Standard
In 1973, agents from the Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms Bureau
(ATF) presented subpoenas to the presidents of two Georgia banks
at which Mitch Miller held personal accounts.160 The subpoenas
compelled the release of all bank statements and other financial
records related to Miller’s accounts in their possession.161 The banks
complied with the subpoenas, and the recovered financial information revealed—as the agents had suspected—a number of financial
transactions related to the illegal practice of possessing a still and
distilling whiskey without paying the appropriate taxes.162 The
subpoenas had not been issued by a court, and Miller had not been
informed that the subpoenas had been served.163 His motion to
suppress the evidence was denied by the district court, but his subsequent conviction was reversed by the court of appeals on Fourth
Amendment grounds.164 The Supreme Court was thus faced with the

158.
(2009).
159.
160.
161.
162.
163.
164.

See Orin S. Kerr, The Case for the Third-Party Doctrine, 107 MICH. L. REV. 561, 575
Id. at 577.
United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 437 (1976).
Id.
See id. at 436, 438.
Id. at 438-39.
Id.
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question of whether the financial records at issue were subject to a
“reasonable expectation of privacy.”165
The Court concluded that the answer to that question must be
“no.”166 The Court pointed out that Miller “can assert neither ownership nor possession” over “the business records of the banks.”167 The
Court rejected Miller’s contention that he justifiably relied on the
continued privacy of his financial information, even after turning it
over to the banks.168 Invoking Katz, the Court held that Miller had
“knowingly expose[d] to the public” his financial information, setting
it outside the scope of Fourth Amendment protection.169 The Court
refused to accept the proposition that Miller could retain any
reasonable expectation of privacy over information that he had
voluntarily exposed to the public.170
The Court considered a similar case, Smith v. Maryland, in 1979,
when a telephone company installed a pen register at the request of
the police to record the numbers dialed from the home of a suspected criminal.171 The register revealed that the suspect had placed
a call to the phone of a robbery victim who had been receiving
threatening calls from a person identifying himself as the robber.172
Based on this evidence, the suspect was charged and convicted of
robbery, over his attempted motion to suppress.173
Even though this case bears substantial similarities to the facts
of Katz, the Court still found grounds for distinction. Unlike the
contents of a telephone conversation, which the Katz Court had
unequivocally placed under the protection of the Fourth Amendment, a pen register records only the number that an individual has
165. See id. at 442.
166. Id.
167. Id. at 440.
168. Id. at 442.
169. Id. (quoting Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967)).
170. Id. (“[C]hecks are not confidential communications but negotiable instruments to be
used in commercial transactions.”). Understandably, this decision ruffled the feathers of the
liberals on the Court. The dissent pointed out that, although a bank’s customers might
voluntarily reveal their financial information to bank employees, they continue to reasonably
expect the information to be kept private. Id. at 449 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (“A bank
customer’s reasonable expectation is that, absent compulsion by legal process, the matters he
reveals to the bank will be utilized by the bank only for internal banking purposes.”).
171. 442 U.S. 735, 737 (1979).
172. Id.
173. Id. at 737-38.
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dialed.174 The Court held that “[a]ll telephone users realize that
they must ‘convey’ phone numbers to the telephone company,”
making it unreasonable to expect such information to be kept private.175 The Court went on to invoke the freshly established Miller
doctrine, comparing information shared with a phone company to
financial records shared with a bank.176 In doing so, the defendant
had “assumed the risk” that the company would reveal the information to police.177
The holdings of these two cases have fused into what can be
considered today as modern third-party doctrine. In short, any
objects or information voluntarily turned over to a third party, directly or indirectly, are not subject to any expectation of privacy that
society is willing to accept and are therefore not protected by the
Fourth Amendment.178 This approach has drawn its fair share of
critics, almost all of whom contend that the doctrine does not accurately reflect either people’s subjective expectation of privacy or
society’s willingness to accept it.179
B. Carpenter and Third-Party Doctrine
For many scholars, the third-party doctrine has not aged well in
the era of big data. While a person’s decision to turn information
over to a third party may once have indicated that they lacked an
expectation of privacy, modern people routinely use the internet to
communicate and the cloud to store sensitive information.180 In fact,
evidence suggests that average Americans consider many types of
digital information within the traditional Smith-Miller scope of
174. Id. at 741.
175. Id. at 742.
176. See id. at 744.
177. Id. Once again, this assertion was met by a fierce dissent objecting to the idea that a
person’s justifiable privacy interest is obliterated the moment they turn information over to
any third party, especially in situations in which they have no choice in the matter. Id. at 749
(Marshall, J., dissenting) (“Privacy is not a discrete commodity, possessed absolutely or not
at all. Those who disclose certain facts to a bank or phone company for a limited business
purpose need not assume that this information will be released to other persons for other
purposes.”).
178. Kerr, supra note 158, at 563.
179. See Lucas Issacharoff & Kyle Wirshba, Restoring Reason to the Third Party Doctrine,
100 MINN. L. REV. 985, 992-93 (2016).
180. Id. at 993.
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third-party exceptions more private than certain other areas that
are protected by the Fourth Amendment.181
On some level, this reflects of a problem that existed long before
the advent of the cloud, a problem recognized by the dissenters in
the Smith and Miller cases.182 Namely, there is a difference between
information turned over to a single source out of necessity and
information voluntarily disclosed to the public at large. Fourth
Amendment scholar Sherry Colb points out that “treating exposure to a limited audience as identical to exposure to the world,
means failing to recognize degrees of privacy in the Fourth Amendment context.”183 These “degrees of privacy” have always existed;
they have simply become more apparent as advancing technology
has made it easier to access sensitive information.184 It is not unreasonable to suggest that when people take what is private and
make it public, they have forfeited their expectation of privacy.185
But what they “seek[ ] to preserve as private, even in an area
accessible to the public, may be constitutionally protected.”186
The Court seemed to recognize this problem when it rendered its
decision in Carpenter.187 It referenced the “seismic shifts in digital
technology” that have allowed detailed tracking of everyone with a
smartphone, as well as the fact that such location data is not really
voluntarily “shared” with the cell service companies.188 Critically, it
also called back to a notion expressed in Riley v. California that an
individual can have a diminished privacy interest without completely abrogating all Fourth Amendment protection.189 The Court
used this reasoning (and a good bit of legal finagling) to find thirdparty doctrine inapplicable without overruling any part of either
181. See, e.g., CHRISTOPHER SLOBOGIN, PRIVACY AT RISK: THE NEW GOVERNMENT
SURVEILLANCE AND THE FOURTH AMENDMENT 184-86 (2007) (finding that most people consider
a search of private emails more intrusive than pat downs or vehicle searches).
182. See supra notes 170, 177.
183. Sherry F. Colb, What Is a Search? Two Conceptual Flaws in Fourth Amendment
Doctrine and Some Hints of a Remedy, 55 STAN. L. REV. 119, 122 (2002).
184. See id.
185. Id. at 124-26.
186. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351-52 (1967).
187. Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206 (2018).
188. Id.
189. Id. at 2219; see also Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373, 392 (2014) (“The fact that an
arrestee has diminished privacy interests does not mean that the Fourth Amendment falls
out of the picture entirely.”).
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Smith or Miller.190 Of course, the only way to manage this was by
focusing on the content of the information, rather than its
location.191 This would seem to suggest that some categories of
information, regardless of whether they have been “voluntarily”
disclosed to a third-party corporation, are simply too private to allow
an unsympathetic traditional application of third-party doctrine.
C. Third-Party Doctrine and the Obtainable Information
Standard
Many commentators believe that, whatever the third-party
doctrine was once worth, it has lost its usefulness and should be
retired in favor of a more modern understanding of privacy expectations. This may very well be true. However, it should be noted that
the obtainable information standard does not require the doctrine
to be overruled or even modified any more than it already has been
by Carpenter.192 In other words, the standard would work even if the
Court chooses to retain third-party doctrine.
The third-party doctrine is based on the presumption that information willingly turned over to a third party has been “expose[d] to
the public” and therefore necessarily fails the Katz test.193 If need
be, this presumption could carry over to an information-based
approach. If information has fallen into the hands of a third party,
the government need not resort to trespass or surveillance to obtain
it. So long as the third party is willing to hand the information over,
the third-party doctrine can be upheld with the obtainable information framework.
Taking the Court’s two landmark decisions in this area as
examples, it is easy to see how the obtainable information standard
might apply. In the case of Mitch Miller, his bank records were
voluntarily disclosed to the bank itself, at least in the sense that he
190. See Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2220.
191. Id. at 2219 (“There is a world of difference between the limited types of personal
information addressed in Smith and Miller and the exhaustive chronicle of location
information casually collected by wireless carriers today.”).
192. See id. at 2217 (refusing to extend the Smith-Miller standard to cell phone location
records).
193. See United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 442 (1976) (quoting Katz v. United States,
389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967)).
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knew his bank had access to the information contained within
them.194 Rather than resorting to physical intrusion or surveillance,
the government simply obtained the information by taking it from
the bank itself.195 As such, there was no violation of the obtainable
information standard.
The Smith case is more troubling, as the installation of a pen
register can hardly be said not to constitute surveillance.196
Furthermore, such a device almost certainly seems to fall within the
scope of “surveillance technology” as discussed earlier in this
Note.197 However, the question is no less easily resolved. As the
Court pointed out in Smith, unlike the content of a phone conversation, the number being dialed is willingly turned over to the phone
company, as the phone call could not be carried out otherwise.198
Therefore, although the government in this case did resort to
surveillance to gather information, that information was not
otherwise unavailable. The government could theoretically have
casually acquired the information indirectly through the phone
company, which had full access to the numbers being dialed by the
defendant.199 As such, the information at stake in Smith can be
construed to comply with the obtainable information standard to the
extent that the use of surveillance technology was not necessary.
Furthermore, this point raises a compelling distinction between
the information at issue in Smith and in Carpenter. In Smith, the
phone company’s access to the numbers its clients dialed was not for
the purpose of creating a log of which numbers were dialed or for
identifying the people at either end of a conversation.200 Rather, it
was a collateral necessity of the company’s need to connect its customers with the intended recipients of their phone calls.201 Using
this logic, it cannot be maintained that the technology allowing the
company’s access to the numbers Smith dialed was primarily used
for the purpose of gathering the type of information at issue in that
194.
195.
196.
197.
198.
199.
200.
201.

See id.
See id. at 437-38.
See Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 737 (1979).
See supra Part II.B.2.b.
Smith, 442 U.S. at 742.
See id.
See id.
Id.
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case. On the other hand, the CSLI data in Carpenter, whether accessed by the government or by the phone company, was gathered
and catalogued specifically for the purpose of tracking the phone’s
location.202 Therefore, the primary purpose of the computer systems
that compile CSLI is, in fact, to gather the very type of information
at issue in that case.203
In this sense, the obtainable information standard bridges the
gap between traditional third-party doctrine and the holding of
Carpenter, addressing the fears of many academic commentators on
the matter.204 Under the standard, it would not matter whether the
government or a third party initially obtained the information at
issue. Only the nature of the information itself and the technology
used to obtain it would be relevant to the inquiry. In doing so, the
obtainable information standard preserves the third-party doctrine’s
legitimate public interests without risking betrayal of the increasingly complex degrees of privacy afforded by modern technology.205
CONCLUSION
The legacy of Justice Harlan’s two-prong test for identifying constitutionally protected interests is prolific and yet decidedly mixed.
Traditional application of the Fourth Amendment had been relatively simple: either the government physically intruded upon a
specific constitutionally protected area or there was no violation
whatsoever.206 But Katz opened the door for government surveillance to be judged under the framework of the Fourth Amendment,
even when such surveillance did not involve physical intrusion into
a protected space.207 Such a major development prompted a slew of
new questions and concerns, few of which were adequately addressed by the ambiguity and circularity of the “reasonable
202. See Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2212 (2018); see also Lacambra, supra
note 73.
203. See Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2212.
204. See, e.g., Melody J. Brannon, Carpenter v. United States: Building a Property-Based
Fourth Amendment Approach for Digital Data, 33 CRIM. JUST. 20, 26 (2019) (stating that the
third-party doctrine is “on life support” after Carpenter).
205. See Colb, supra note 183, at 122.
206. See, e.g., Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 464 (1928) (stating that the Fourth
Amendment applies only to “material things”).
207. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 353 (1967).
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expectation of privacy.” It necessarily required the Court to broaden
its focus beyond the physical realm and allow the Fourth Amendment to protect information as well as property.
The Supreme Court has avoided explicitly stating this reality for
over half a century, but a cursory review of the relevant case law
indicates that it has been trending in this direction. Carpenter was
just one more nail (albeit a decisive one) in the proverbial coffin of
the strictly textualist property-based approach to Fourth Amendment doctrine. Scholars may find ways to force the round pegs of
Carpenter and Jones into the square holes of the property-based
approach or the historical approach,208 but these are temporary
solutions which serve only to postpone the inevitable. As it turns
out, modern Fourth Amendment law is tied to both the quantity and
quality of the information obtained.209
Having recognized this, it is simple to create an all-encompassing
information-based standard for cases of warrantless government
surveillance that both accounts for all the Court’s post-Katz holdings
and provides a clear roadmap for the future: absent probable cause,
the Fourth Amendment prevents the government from obtaining
information that could not otherwise be obtained without resorting
to surveillance technology or trespassing on private property.210
Provided a proper definition for “surveillance technology” and a
rough idea of how this standard would have applied to other cases,
the obtainable information rule could provide some much-needed
clarity for lower courts.
It may be true that the Katz test is somewhat “circular” and “subjective,”211 but it has done a far better job accounting for society’s
evolving privacy values than a traditional application of Fourth

208. See, e.g., Burrus & Knight, supra note 20, at 111; Brannon, supra note 204, at 24-26.
209. See Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2223 (2018) (deciding based on the
“depth, breadth, and comprehensive reach” of CSLI).
210. See Colb, supra note 183, at 125.
211. See Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 34 (2001).
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Amendment doctrine. Now that the digital age is well underway, it
deserves to be cemented in a clean and clear rule for checking government surveillance.
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